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Introduction 1
“If you really look closely, most overnight successes took a long time.” 2 From the most
iconic businesses like Dodge to the more recent little Facebook, they all started from a
continuing effort of people. In business, success is a direct result of a hoard of people actively
committing acts for the benefit of a venture that is incapable of acting on its own. Companies and
particularly corporations, require people to act on their behalf. 3
However, a business is nothing more than a legal fiction. 4 While we treat a business as a
legal person separate from that of shareholders, in truth, a corporation without people is
incapable of acting. 5 So the question arises on how to structure the governance system of a
corporation? Is implementing a system of one share equals one vote the best option? Or is an
alternative a better approach, such as having some people’s vote count more than others, or
should some people not have the right to vote at all? Or is the best option some mathematic
equations that determine a person’s voting power? Most importantly, are there consequences to
the action of choosing one method?
Businesses have tried several different options in order to govern their affairs, but the
default has become one share equals one vote. In practice, about nine out of ten public
companies employ this method. 6 However, a resurgence is occurring of another type of structure,
particularly seen in the technology industry. 7 That structure is the dual voting structure. 8 The

1 A special thanks to Professor Michele Benedetto Neitz and Dean Michael Daw for their assistance with the
creation of this paper.
2
Jacquelyn Smith, Emmie Martin, and Jenna Goudreau, 88 Quotes n Success From The World’s Most
Accomplished People, Business Insider (Sept 22, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/success-quotes-fromaccomplished-people-2014-9. (Quoting Steve Jobs).
3
The use of word corporation or business is meant to refer to a corporation, companies, subchapter C corporation,
business, and similar structures.
4
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Legal Fiction, Encyclopaedia Britannica (April 12, 2018),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/law-report.
5
Id.
6
Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Voting Stock, https://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock.
7
James Chen, Dual-class Stock, (Updated Apr 26, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dualclassstock.asp.
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reason behind the resurgence of dual voting structures is unknown; it could be a result of stories
of founders like Steve Job being pushed out, a method to keep more control over their creation,
or some other business or personal reason.
In essence, a dual voting structure separates the economic interest of a share from its
voting power. This system is supposed to grant the founder with autonomy and the ability to not
be beholden to a Wall Street Investor’s desire for instant gratification. This system allows the
founders to take more risks and execute long term plans without the threat of being removed
from their position because that plan threatens or diminishes the immediate profitability of the
company despite have stronger long-term merits.
However, this resurgence has brought forward a slew of questions about the convention
of corporate governance. These conventions are settled for the default system, but their
application to dual voting structures are hazy. The most pressing of these issues are the concerns
around fiduciary duty and its impacts on the founder. The concern is, should there be more done
in order to address growing concerns that these types of structures have a negative impact on the
outside shareholders?
Question and Scope
The purpose of the research is to determine the role of fiduciary duty in dual voting
structures. From there, determine what if anything needs to be done moving forward. The scope
of the dual-voting structures is that of public companies. The analysis of the dual-voting
structure is broken into the following parts: (1) an overview of the history of the structure, (2)
defining a dual voting structure, (3) a case study, (4) fiduciary duty and its effects on dual-voting
structures, and (5) recommendation.
8

The dual voting structure is also called a multi-class stock structure, dual-class ownership, and several others. This
paper will generally use a dual-class structure.
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Boundaries of Research & Analysis
This paper has several limitations in order to answer the questions described in the
preceding paragraph. The paper is, primarily, focused on the corporate entity known as a
corporation as defined by 26 U.S.C sub-chapter C (C-Corporation). 9 This is a corporation that is
tax separate from its owners and the default method for major corporations. 10 This definition
excludes limited liability companies and other entities that may adopt dual-voting structures.
While many of the findings of this paper may have universal application to both corporations and
other kinds of business structures, the focus has been limited to C-Corporations.
Additionally, there are special cases and exceptions that are either briefly mentioned or
omitted from the paper unless those cases or exceptions would materially change the outcome of
the paper. The purpose of this restriction is to see if dual- voting structures as a concept and not
certain cases would meet the obligation of fiduciary duty. For more information, the sources
contained within the footnotes of the paper cover exceptions or special cases.
Also, this paper will only look at the duty that a shareholder with superior voting rights
has to a minority shareholder. 11 Any obligations that minority shareholders may have to a
shareholder with superior voting rights or any obligations to the corporate entity will be ignored
under this analysis. 12 Also, the issue of common stock versus preferred stock will be ignored for
the purposes of this paper. 13
Additionally, the research in this paper is primarily, but not exclusively, limited to
Delaware, the capital of most corporate formation, and New York, the heart of the American
financial system. The reasoning is that these two states have an outsize effect on corporate
26 U.S. Code § 301
Gregory Holmes, Definition of a Subchapter C Corporation, Chron, https://smallbusiness.chron.com/definitionsubchapter-c-corporation-25936.html.
11
A minority shareholder, in this case, refers to shares that limited or zero voting rights unless otherwise stated.
12
These shareholders with inferior voting rights may also be referred to in this paper as majority shareholders.
13
For the purpose of this paper, shares and shareholders will only refer to common stock and common shareholders.
9

10

JER'RON J.L. DINWIDDIE II

5

THE DODGE BROTHERS’ MONSTER
governance. Delaware Chancery Court is the preeminent authority on corporate governance and
a hub for corporate governance litigation. Additionally, New York is home to the New York
Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and have many corporations headquarters.
Historical Perspective of Business Entity Selection
Business in America
The standard for most of business history was for a business to structure itself like what is
modernly called a sole proprietorship. 14 A sole proprietorship is a type of structure where the
owner and the business are the same entity. 15 These types of structures only allowed for one
owner of the business. 16
However, there were a few outliers that resemble a modern-day business structure. The
first business in the world to issue shares to people was the Dutch East India Company. 17 The
Dutch East India Company effectively had the first initial public offering in the early 1600s,
despite that concept not develop until later. 18 As time progressed, this corporate entity structure
continued to develop and be refined.
The key turning point for American Business was the Revolutionary War, which left the
country with many questions about how to structure its affairs moving forward. 19 The business
community was engaging in a similar conversation. As earlier as 1784, companies were tackling

14

Andrew Beattie, What was the First Company to Issue Stock?, (Oct 23, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/first-company-issue-stock-dutch-east-india.asp. See also,
Investopedia, What is the History of Corporations in America? (Updated Aug 02, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/041515/what-history-corporations-america.asp.
15
Alexandra Twin, Sole Proprietorship, Investopedia, ( Nov 7, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/soleproprietorship.asp
16
Id.
17
Beattie supra note 8.
18
Id.
19
See generally, Various, The Federalist Papers (1787-1788).
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the problem of ownership and voting rights. 20 Of particular interest was when there were
multiple owners, and each owner would have different percentages of ownership in the
company.

21

At the time, there was not a default system of corporate governance for business

owners to rely on.
In these early years of the country, the prevalent norm for adopting a corporate entity was
performed only by banking institutions.22 The landscape of the laws at this time for corporate
governance was void of controlling precedents or statutes. 23 This vacancy left businesses the
option of creating their systems of governance. These rules were mostly created and recorded in
corporate charters. 24 In Maryland, around 1819 companies were gradually moving towards a
system of one vote per share. 25 In 1834, a New Jersey Appellate Court ruled that each
shareholder is entitled to one vote regardless of ownership unless a statute or other rules state
otherwise. 26 Other companies used a complex set of equations to determine a person’s voting
rights and determine the maximum amount of control that was allowed to be allotted to one
person. 27 In the end, most companies moved towards a default of one vote per share. 28
However, that did not prevent the companies from using an uneven voting structure. One
of the first companies to employ a dual-voting structure was the International Silver Company,

20

Stephen Bainbridge, Understanding Dual-Class Stock Part I: An Historical Perspective, Professor Bainbridge,
(Sept. 09, 17) https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2017/09/understanding-dual-classstock-part-i-an-historical-perspective.html#_ftn4.
21
Id.
22
Investopedia, What is the History of Corporations in America, (Updated Aug 03, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/041515/what-history-corporations-america.asp.
23
Bainbridge supra note 13.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Taylor v. Griswold, 14 NJL 222 (New Jersey 1834)
27
Bainbridge supra note 13.
28
Id.
JER'RON J.L. DINWIDDIE II
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which maintained that type of structure up to 1902. 29 The use of this kind of structure came to a
head in the 1920s with the attempted IPO of Dodge Brothers and several other companies.
The Dodge Brothers and The Creation of a Monster
In 1897 the Dodge brothers, John and Horace Dodge, opened a small bike store in
Detroit, Michigan. 30 That store later became the foundation of a premier American car line,
Dodge, Inc. In 1900, the Dodge Brothers founded the Dodge Brothers company, which at the
time sold parts for cars. 31 The company’s first products were engines and chassis components,
which they sold to companies like Ford Motor Company and the Olds Motor Vehicle
Company. 32 The company was even a shareholder of Ford during this time. 33 However, Ford's
desire to build its cars internally eventually caused the two companies to end all dealings
together, and Dodge sold its stake in Ford. 34
In 1913 while continuing to make parts for the other companies, the Dodge Brothers
started to build its first independently made car. 35 In the same year, the company was
rechristened as the Dodge Brothers Motor Company in honor of its beginning to sell cars. 36 As
early as 1916, the company cars were listed as the second-largest car company in terms of
sales. 37 In 1920, John and Horace Dodge both passed away from unrelated illnesses. 38
The loss of the founders caused the company to slowly lose its position as a top tier car
company. 39 In 1925, Dillon, Read & Company brought the Dodge Brothers company for $146

29

Id.
History.com Editors, Dodge Co-Founder Dies, (Jul 28, 2019), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/dodgeco-founder-dies.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Dodge V. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich.459, (Mich. 1919).
34
Id.
35
History.com Editors supra note 23.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
30
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million.40 Under the new ownership, Dodge restructured its governance system into a dual voting
structure. 41 Dillon, Read & Company made its intention clear that they planned to take the
company public. 42 However, in 1926, the New York Stock Exchange banned business with a
dual voting structure from being able to go public. 43 The ban was in response to the public outcry
about Dodge’s attempt to go public with a dual voting structure. 44 Then in 1928, the company
was sold to the Chrysler for $170 million. 45
America’s Response to Dodge
The public and Congress responded negatively to companies like Dodge and their desire
to going public during the time without equal voting right for shareholders. 46 The opposition
included people like Harvard Professor of Economics, William Z. Ripley, who made it his
mission to roll back this growing pattern among corporations. 47 Professor Ripley led President
Calvin Coolidge (Republican) and the Republican-controlled Congress to consider taking
legislative or executive action against these types of companies. 48 However, both the President
and Congress were unable to make a definitive legislative or executive action against these types
of business. 49
In 1926, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) announced a new listing requirement
that effectively banned companies with dual-voting structures from listing on the

40

Id.
Zoe Condon, A Snapshot of Dual-Class Share Structures in the Twenty-First Century: A solution to Reconcile
Shareholder Protections with Founder Autonomy, Emory L. J. Vol 68.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. See also, Peter N. Flocost, Toward A Liability Rule Approach to the "One Share, One Vote" Controversy: An
Epitaph for The Sec's Rule 19c-4?, U. Pa. L. Rev. Vol. 138:1761
45
History.com Editors supra note 23.
46
Flocost supra note 36.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
41
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exchange. 50 The NYSE new listing requirement was that every company must have a "one share
one vote" system going forward. 51 Companies already listed were expected to either convert into
this governance system or delist from the exchange.

52

President Coolidge and the Republican

Congress lauded the NYSE's decision to stem the growth of dual-voting structures. 53
However, the new listing rule was not without its detractors.

54

Some companies, in

efforts to maintain their control over their businesses, took their companies private to avoid the
growing discomfort with dual-voting structure. 55 Additionally, the listing requirement was only
for the NYSE. 56 However, as one of the oldest and most prestigious stock exchanges in the
country, this placed tremendous pressure on companies to adopt the "one vote per share" rule.
In 1971, the National Association of Securities Dealer Automated Quotation System or
NASDAQ was founded. 57 NASDAQ never formally adopted the listing requirement of one vote
per share. In the 1980s, NASDAQ led other exchanges not to employ a similar listing
requirement. 58 The presence of NASDAQ put pressure on the NYSE to follow suit with
removing the listing requirement or risk losing companies to the new competition. In 1984, the
NYSE determined that they would no longer keep the listing requirement in order not to lose
companies to its competition. 59 Many people in the American public were critical of the idea of
allowing these types of businesses to exist and were against the change of the rule. 60

50

Id. See also, Condon supra note 33.
Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and Professor Gilson, 89 Colum.
L. Rev. 979, 979–85 (1989).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Ellen Terrell, History of the American and NASDAQ Stock Exchanges, (Oct 2012)
https://www.loc.gov/rr/business/amex/amex.html.
58
Condon supra note 33.
59
Flocost supra note 36.
60
Id.
51
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That left the states, state regulators, Congress, and the Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to regulate these types of businesses. Many state Legislative adopted a
hands-off approach to regulations of these types of businesses. 61 A few state regulators attempted
to use "Blue sky" laws in order to make rules that would either limit or eliminate these types of
structures. 62

63

However, the states mostly had little to no effect on these types of

structures. 64 The reasoning that the states' attempts failed is likely because businesses could
incorporate in a state that did not have the listing requirement and skirt the law despite being
physically located in the state. Congress twice attempted to pass statutes on the subject, but both
times the statute was defeated. 65 That left the SEC.
The SEC Response and Following Backlash
In July of 1988, the SEC promulgated and then shortly later adopted Rule 19c-5. 66 The
rule called for a ban on any corporate action that had the effect of "nullifying, restricting, or
disparately reducing the per-share voting rights of existing [common stockholders]." 67 In
practice, the new rule was an attempt to effectively banned all businesses from employing a dual
voting structure with a few exceptions. 68
In 1989, Business Roundtable sued the SEC from being able to enforce the rule in the
Washington DC courts under the theory that the SEC did not have the statutory authority to make
such a rule. 69 The DC Circuit Court of Appeals rendered final judgment for Business
Roundtable, stating that the rule exceeds the statutory authority in the creation and enforcement

61

Condon supra note 33.
Blue sky laws are state securities laws.
63
Condon supra note 33.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Flocost supra note 36.
67
Condon supra note 33.
68
Id. The exceptions to the rule are beyond the scope of the paper.
69
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
62
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of Rule 19c-5. 70 The ruling made the Rule 19c-5 an ultra vires act of the SEC and as such void.
The case was never heard before the US Supreme Court. The DC Circuit Court effectively
ushered in an era of unregulated control of the dual voting structure.
The Current Landscape of Business in America
The court’s decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC, to overrule the SEC Rule19c-5
allowed many companies to take the opportunity to carry forth a dual voting structure. Now,
these companies on the aggregate have a market capitalization (M Cap) that exceeds 3 trillion
dollars. 71 M Cap is the dollar amount of the value of all of a company's outstanding share. 72 So,
the combine M Cap of all dull voting structures exceeds 3 trillion dollars. This M cap is about
10% of the market capitation of the US. 73 This valuation is equal to that of the entire stock
market of France, who is ranked 5th in the world. 74
However, by no means are these structures the majority of American businesses. These
businesses make up between 6%-10% of major US stock exchanges.

75

The majority of the

growth of these businesses has occurred since the rapid growth of the technology industry in the
US. 76
Many of the companies, but not exclusively, that employ this method are technology
companies from Silicon Valley. Some of the most prominent examples of this are Google and

70

Id.
Condon supra note 33.
72
James Chen, Market Capitalization, Investopedia, Feb 3, 2020,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp
73
The word banks state that the market capitation for the US is 32.12 in 2017. The Global Economy, Stock Market
Capitalization, in dollars-country ranking, Global Economy,
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/stock_market_capitalization_dollars/ (citing World Bank)
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Chen supra 6.
71
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Facebook. These dual-class voting structures make up about 19% of the tech companies founded
between 2012-2016, which was a two-times increase from the previous five years.

77

However, these companies are not without their detractors. The Council of Institutional
Investors (CII) has become an outspoken critic of these structures. 78 One of the organization’s
current goals is to limit the power of these structures.

79

One of the ways that CII is seeking to

achieve this goal is by have stock exchanges make listing rules that mandate that these
companies have a sunset provision, that over time removes the superior voting rights. 80Also, the
S&P Dow Jones has banned the addition of any new dual voting structures on the
exchange, while the Russel Exchange has mandated that the free float of voting power be at least
5%. 81 Free-float is a calculation that takes the mt cap of a company calculated by taking
the equity's price and multiplying it by the number of shares readily available in the market. 82
Dual Voting structures
“Nobody decided one day to remove the element of democracy from corporations. While
the corporation laws of every state, solemnly recite that the shareholders” hold the ultimate
power in the corporation, “shareholders [have been] relegated to a rubber-stamp process of
affirmation.”

83

In no place else is that sentiment stronger than in dual voting structure. In

contrast to the default system where shareholders are a check on insiders and directors, the dual
voting structure enables a system of entrenchment of insiders where the majority of shareholders
have been regulated to a near powerless class. The power of the corporation rests in the hands of
77

Id.
Council of Institutional Investors supra note 5.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. See also, Martin Chang, Dual Voting Structures, (Aug. 26, 2019),
https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2019/08/26/661/.
82
James Chen, Free-Float Methodology, Investopedia, (Apr 4, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/freefloatmethodology.asp.
83
Les Greenberg and James McRitchie, Request for Rulemaking to Amend Rule 142-8(i) To Allow Shareholder
Proposals to Elect Directors, August 1, 2002.
78
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the founders, who are officers, directors, and shareholders with the majority of the voting power.
This combination that removes the threat of their ousting also makes their word law.
Legal Definition of Dual Voting Structure
The default system for corporate governance is that each share grants the owner of the
"one share one vote." 84 A dual voting system is an alternative system that allows a company to
rearrange the governance system more favorably for founders and other insiders. A dual-class
voting structure has multiple classes of stock. 85 The difference between the classes of shares
would be voting rights and dividend payments. 86 The only relevant one for this paper is voting
rights. The voting difference creates a superior class and inferior class of stock.
The superior class
The superior class of shares has a scheme that grants them more voting rights per share
than that of the inferior class in terms of voting. 87 The number of votes per share could range
from two to ten votes per share; however, no law caps the highest number of votes one share can
be allowed. For example, WeWork once had a scheme that grants 20 votes per share. 88 These
types of schemes create situations like Echostar, where the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) owns
only 5% of the total shares outstanding but has 90% of the voting power. 89 Often a feature of
these classes is that they convert into the inferior class after a specific condition is met, generally
that condition is that the founder no longer owns the stock. Some companies have adopted
sunrise provisions to achieve that conversion. 90 A sunrise provision (also known as sunset
provision) is a provision that converts the shares automatically after a specific time
84

Bainbridge, supra 13.
Condon supra note 33.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
See, We Company, Draft Registration Statement (Jun 06, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1533523/000162827919000233/0001628279-19-000233-index.htm.
89
Chen supra 6.
90
Andrew Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures,
(Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 228).
85
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period. 91 Other companies like Facebook, for example, have a reversion clause. 92 These
reversion clauses mandate that once the share leaves the hand of that person, the shares
automatically reverts to an inferior class. 93
The inferior class
The inferior class has either limited rights or no voting rights at all. 94 A limited voting
right would be a share that has fewer votes per share than that of the superior class of
stocks. 95 An example of this may be that the superior class has five votes per share, then the
inferior may have anywhere between one and four votes per share. These shares have at least one
vote per share. The other way to be an inferior share is if the shares do not have voting rights in
decisions or elections of members of the Board of Directors.

96

Companies may employ a

combination of inferior with limited voting rights and no voting rights. Google's parent company,
Alphabet, has one superior class and two inferior, one class that has limited voting rights and the
other class with no voting rights. 97
The Corporate Desire for Dual Voting Structure
The adoption of a dual-voting structure is generally a business decision. The primary
factor behind that decision is control.98 These types of structures allow an entrepreneur and other
insiders to give away a large portion of the business without losing control of the business. 99 In
theory, this structure allows entrepreneurs to focus on long term goals and allow for these

91

Id.
See Facebook Articles of Incorporation § 3.8 (b).
93
Id.
94
Condon supra note 33.
95
Chang, supra 75.
96
Id.
97
Alphabet Articles of Incorporation Art IV § 2(a)(i)-(iii).
98
Ryan Roberts, Dual-class Common Stock Structures for Founders, (Dec. 10, 2015)
https://startuplawyer.com/incorporation/dual-class-common-stock-structure-for-founders.
99
Id.
92

JER'RON J.L. DINWIDDIE II

15

THE DODGE BROTHERS’ MONSTER
executives to more often take moderately risky options that have more significant long term
benefits. 100 Or they just take the view that is geared towards some other view.
Another critical part is who has these shares with superior voting rights. These structures
provide the company with one or a few dedicated owners. 101 Generally, these are the
entrepreneurs who founded the company and selected current officers and directors whose
“livelihoods” are at stake. Also, these types of structures allow a business to move quickly in
response to new business opportunities when they know that the person with the most voting
rights will ratify their actions. 102
Additionally, some believe that these structures provide other valuable benefits. One such
(debatable) benefit would be that these structures allow the company to provide greater returns
for all investors. 103 These structures also provide managers with an extra layer of protection from
being removed for making unpopular but otherwise necessary decisions. 104 These structures are
also a useful tool to hamper hostile takeovers from rival companies or private equity companies
looking for a quick dollar. 105
However, in the legal, economic, and business fields, the supposed benefits of the
corporations are highly debated. A key finding among these companies is that they produce
lower returns, lower trading prices, higher management entrenchment, higher executive total
compensation, and lower overall valuations and trading price as compared to single-class

100

Condon supra note 33.
Chang, supra 75.
102
CFA Institute, Dual-Class Shares: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, https://www.cfainstitute.org//media/documents/survey/apac-dual-class-shares-survey-report.ashx.
103
Condon supra note 33.
104
Deloitte, Dual-class Share Structure: Weighing the Risk and Rewards (Apr 09, 2014)
https://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/04/09/dual-class-share-structure-weighing-the-risks-and-rewards/.
105
Id.
101
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firms. 106 In addition to the increased scrutiny from the public, these businesses also face scrutiny
Non-government organizations that are historically and currently devoted to eliminating this
business practice.
The Financial Reality of Dual Voting Structures
Dual-voting structure currently makes up about $3.35 trillion in m cap. 107 Moreover,
these companies make up just less than a fifth of the companies that went public between 20122016. 108 As a whole, these companies have granted the public less than one percent total voting
rights. 109
The Case Study of Dual Voting Structure
A feature of many tech startups is the fact that they employ a dual voting
structure. 110 Another commonality among many of these businesses, particularly noticeable
around the initial public offering, is their corporate governance red flags. 111 The red flags run the
gambits of bad decisions, excess, and potentially breaking laws. Dual-voting structures allow the
entrenchment of founders, officers, and directors that commit these acts. The problems of this
structure are considered to be "a feature of their model" and not as "a bug" to work out. 112 The
prime example is We Company, better known by its wholly-owned subsidiary WeWork. The
problems with WeWork are "an indictment against the dual-class structures as opposed to” Mr.
Neumann (the Founder and now former CEO) or WeWork. 113

106

Vijay Govindarajan, Shivaram Rajgopal, Anup Srivastava, and Luminita Enache, Should Dual-Class Shares Be
Banned?, (Dec. 03, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/12/should-dual-class-shares-be-banned.
107
Condon supra note 33.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
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111
Ellen Florian, One Bright Spot in the WeWork Debacle: Turn Out Investors Actually Care About Corporate
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Who is We?
Founded in 2010 in New York, New York, WeWork was created to be a “disruptor in the
commercial real estate industry.” 114 WeWork is a wholly owned subsidy of the We Company
(We Co.). The company was founded by Miguel McKelvey, Adam Neumann, and Rebekah
Neumann.

115

The mission of the company is to “create a world where people work to make a

life, not just a living.” 116 The company operates under the business model of working to
“monetize [their] global platform through a variety of solutions, mainly by selling memberships
but also by providing ancillary value-added products and services to [their] members and
extending [their] platform beyond offering workspace.” 117 The company currently has 527,000
memberships as of the second quarter of 2019. 118 Additionally, the company has a capacity of
604,000 workstations as of the second quarter of 2019. 119
However, the company is not without its risks. One of the key risks listed in the
prospectus is the fact that Mr. Neumann’s voting power is not necessarily tied to the benefit of
the company but that he has the right to vote on manners as he sees fit even if it may harm other
investors.

120

While WeWork markets itself as a tech company, in reality, the company is a

middleman between sub-leasee and commercial landlords. More importantly, the company has
34 billion dollars of future debt tied to its realty operations.

121

For a better perspective of the

financial condition of the company, We Co. had a loss of $3,614,152,000 (approximately)
between Jan 01, 2016, to the second quarter of 2019. 122
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WeWork, Mission Page, https://www.wework.com/mission.
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116
We Company, Draft Registration Statement pg. 46 (Jun 06, 2019).
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The company attempted to go public in the third quarter of 2019. However, the company
was forced to withdraw its registration statement. 123 Additionally, Mr. Neumann stepped down
as the CEO of the We Co. 124 Also, Mr. Neumann voluntarily had his voting rights reduced from
ten votes to three per share. 125 However, Mr. Neumann is still the chairman of the board and has
many business relations with the company. 126 The primary reason that this result is the red flags
allowed to prosper under their dual-voting structure. 127
Founders’ Control and Influence on We
Mr. Neumann is the key to setting the company’s vision, strategic direction, and
execution of priorities. 128 Despite that, there are several critical concerns about Mr. Neumann.
One of them is that the company does not have an employment agreement in place with Mr.
Neumann.

129

More so, the company does not have any guarantee that Mr. Neumann will

continue his business relationships with the company in any capacity. 130 That was such a vital
concern that it was listed in the prospectus as a risk before Mr. Neumann stepped down. 131 The
concern is stronger considering his resignation as an officer despite still holding a strong voting
interest in the company and the position as chairman of the board of directors. Moreover, the
companies have a host of transactions that involved Mr. Neumann in a multitude of different
capacities. 132 A large part of their business model still depends on the services of Mr.
Neumann. 133
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Florian supra note 110.
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The We company and the fact that We is not Working out
In August of 2019, WeWork, under its parent company The We Company, pulled its
registration statement from the SEC and determine that it is no longer able to go
public. 134 However, the company plans to go public at some undisclosed later date. Much of the
blame has been placed at the feet of the former CEO, Adam Neumann. Mr. Neumann is a cofounder, nonexecutive chairman, and benefits from a dual voting structure. 135 Many of the things
that Mr. Neumann has done that caused him to create a valuable company are now casting a
shadow over that every company’s future. 136
One such example is that Mr. Neumann created a tax scheme that shifted the burden of
future profits from his class of shares to that of other investors. 137 This shift means that when the
company starts to make profits, the tax liability imposed onto shareholders under corresponding
tax law would require that inferior shareholders pay the lion share of the taxes. More so, "We,"
the name of the parent company, was a registered trademark of an entity not affiliated with We
Co. but that of an entity control by Mr. Neumann outside of his capacity as part of We Co. and is
only leased to We Co. 138 That separate entity had no relations with We. Co. Initially, the
trademark was going to be sold to We Co. for a total of $6 million, but after investors place some
pressure on the company, that the deal was unwound.

139

Mr. Neumann has now transferred the

trademark to We Co. free of charge due to complaints. 140 Mr. Neumann also has an ownership

134

Florian supra note 97.
Florian supra note 97.
136
Eliot Brown, How Adam Neumann’s Over the Top Style Built WeWork. ‘This is Not the Way Everybody
Behaves,’ (Sept 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/this-is-not-the-way-everybody-behaves-how-adamneumanns-over-the-top-style-built-wework-11568823827.
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interest in several of the buildings from where We Co. currently lease office space. 141 After
pressure, Mr. Neumann will now turn over any profit that he receives from those properties over
to We Co. 142 Additionally, Mr. Neumann had the company buy him a $60 million private jet for
his personal use. 143
Also, Mr. Neumann has a reputation of spending corporation money on drinks, such as
when the company has handed out bottles of Rosé (retail price $50) and Don Julio (retail price
$110) for free to employees on numerous occasions. 144 This splurging on drinks even occurred
in a meeting where the company had fired 7% of its total workforce to cut costs.

145

Until

recently, Mr. Neumann’s wife had exclusive control to determine the next CEO of We Co. if Mr.
Neumann ever became incapacitated or died. 146
Mr. Neumann’s management style has raised questions, as well. One of the more public
decisions was Mr. Neumann’s decision to ban meat-eating by employees on the
premises. 147 After consulting with executives- who were not involved in the creation of the ban
nor were aware of the ban when it was announced- the company decided that it will no longer
reimburse for meals that contained meat as a part of the meal. 148 The supposed reasoning behind
this decision is supposedly part of the company’s goal of building a more sustainable
environment.

149

Another part of Mr. Neumann’s management style was to fire 20% of

employees to decrease the number of “B players” in the company.

150

“B players” refers to an
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employee who is a capable and steady performer but is not a star employee. 151 This mass layoff
was completely separate from the 7% of the workforce fired.
Mr. Neumann also has an unrealistic expectation of where the company should be going
and what it could reasonably be doing.

152

To note, some people believe that this unrealistic

expectation is part of the reason the company was able to expand at its pace. 153
We Co. also has a host of potential conflicts of interest. These include the fact that two of
Mr. Neumann’s brother-in-law’s work as an executive for the company along with his wife,
Rebekah Neumann (Ms. Neumann is credited as one of the founders of We Co.).

154

Also, the

company has used the parents of a member of the board of directors as brokers for several real
estate deals.

155

The parents were both licensed brokers but only had a small practice and

typically did not handle transactions of that scale. 156
Additionally, many of the construction companies, vendors, and contractors are related to
or friends of either Mr. Neumann or other insiders. 157 Lastly, the company has paid millions of
dollars in loans between the company and the executive and lower-level employees. 158
The Buffett way
In contracts to We Co., Warren Buffet has implemented the same system with a vastly
different outcome, is Berkshire Hathaway. Berkshire Hathaway is a preeminent American
business. Today the company is a holding company that allows Warren Buffet to invest in

151

Thomas J. DeLong, Vineeta Vijayaraghavan, Let Hear It for the B Players, (June 2003),
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business freely.

159

The company has invested in companies such as Geico and Duracell. 160

However, the company traces its history to the late 1880s when Hathaway Manufacturing and
Berkshire Cotton Company combined.
structure.

162

161

Berkshire Hathaway employs a dual-voting

That the company is a success can be boiled down to the fact that in 2018, the

company net profits were $4.02 billion, which was down from a five year high the previous year
of $44.94 billion. 163 The company has been relatively scandal-free, and most news reports center
on Warren Buffets' business acumen. Mr. Buffets' use of a dual-voting system is an ideal
example of the success that this system can bring when it is not marred by scandal.
Fiduciary duty
The task of the fiduciary is to act in the interest of the principal and fulfill the needs of
the principal over that of others and even the interest of fiduciary, themselves. Yet, “‘[n]o man
can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to
the one and despise the other.’” 164 The competing self-interest and the interest of the principal
can cause a tensed interaction that has been remedied by robust jurisprudence. 165
The Creation
Corporate entities are fictitious persons that are unable to act on their own behalf. The
purpose of the organization is to maximize shareholder returns. 166 Generally, actions are taken
either by a corporation’s employees or their agents. An employee is a person who works for hire

159

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Berkshire Hathaway, Encyclopaedia Britannica,
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and receives compensation. 167 An agent is a person that has the authority to affect the legal
relations and create obligations and burdens by their acts on behalf of another. 168 While often,
these two (employee and agent) can both apply, that is not always the case. The principal duty of
an agent is to act for the benefit of the principal. 169
Often, an agent is also an employee, but that is not exclusively the case. 170 Shareholders
are the principal in the relationship, and officers and directors are their agents. 171 The courts
have expanded the definition of who has fiduciary duties to include more people in corporate
settings. 172
Defining the Role of the Principal
To note, these situations are not the traditional definition of principal-agent situations but
are roughly similar. 173 The courts have expanded the jurisprudence to include these cases. For
officers and directors, the company and shareholders as a whole are the principal in all
matters. 174 However, that answer is not always so simple when asking about the relationship
between different stockholders.
In most cases, a shareholder does not have a duty to the company or other
shareholders. 175 However, in select cases, that is not true. For the majority shareholder and
167

Charles J. Muhl, “What is an employee?” The answer depends on the Federal Law, (Jan.
2002),https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/art1full.pdf (citing dictionary). This explanation is a simplified
definition that excludes considerations of independent contractors and the impact of where an employee is both
agent and employee.
168
Restat 3d of Agency.
169
Legal Information Institute, Fiduciary Duty, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty.
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Restat 3d of Agency.
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Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholders as Principals, Key Developments in Corporate Law and Equity: Essays in
Honour of Professor Harold Ford 105-129 (2002).
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so, the courts have affirmatively ruled that officers, directors, and select others in some instances have a fiduciary
duty to both the company and minority owners.
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would be lawyers to clients.
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controlling shareholders, the principal is the minority shareholder. 176 Fiduciary duty also has
implications that shareholders are also the principal to directors. 177
For this paper, there will be the assumption that the principal interest follows the
traditional business maxim and legal purpose of a business of maximizing the return for
shareholders. 178 This maxim means that the principal is primarily looking for the agent to create
the most profitable business possible. However, this assumption is not always valid. 179
Defining the Role of the Agent
This section is exclusively focused on the situations where a shareholder would have an
obligation to another shareholder, and that share then becomes an agent of the other
shareholder(s). While other cases are relevant and will be used for the analysis later, the focus of
this selection is when that obligation derives from their position as shareholder and not as an
officer or director. Lastly, the term principal will refer to inferior shareholders moving forward.
Types
Fiduciary Duty by Virtue of Majority Owners Status
The simplest way to become an agent is as a majority shareholder. A majority
shareholder is a person or entity that owns or controls more than fifty percent of the outstanding
shares. 180 Absence of any super-voting clause, unanimous voting requirements, or the separation
of voting rights from ownership interest, a majority shareholder generally has the power to make
all decisions. 181 Companies like Dell, Inc., a large and public company that has a majority

176
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shareholder, a rare phenomenon. 182 This case of majority status is more common in small or
private companies than large public companies. 183 Lastly, the notion of dual-voting structure
makes this an outdated model because a person can have a majority votes while owning only a
small percentage.
Fiduciary Duty by Virtue of Controlling Shareholder Status
The Stringer is a legal standard that obligates a person to act as a fiduciary despite
having a minority stake in the company. Under Stringer, there are two ways to be a controlling
shareholder: (1) exercise actual control over the business and affairs of the company or dominate
the company board of directors or (2) a member of a small group of shareholders who
collectively own a majority of shares or otherwise have that domination or control. 184At the heart
of the issue is that control is derived from "virtue of the person's position as a shareholder." 185
The first part of the Stringer test is to exercise actual control over the business and affairs
of the company or dominate the company board of directors. 186 Actual control means that they
have control over the day to day operations of the business. 187 The starting point would be the
percentage of shares of the business. However, a large percentage without more is not enough to
be a controlling shareholder if that percentage is short of majority status (more than
50%).

188

Other things to look at would be domineering the board of directors. This result

generally happens either by placing the board in the hands of people under their control or by the
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ability to elect the members. 189 Another factor is the right to veto decisions or contractual rights
that grant more power than under the statute.

190

The second part of Stringer is the membership as part of either: (1) an individual belongs
to a group of shareholders that make up a majority or (2) a person belongs to a group such as a
consortium or family that have control. 191 Generally, the minimum amount of share needed to
call a shareholder’s meeting is enough. 192
Fiduciary Duty Existence in Dual Voting Structure
The threshold issue is, are shareholders with majority voting interest in dual voting
structures a controlling shareholder or a majority shareholder that owe the other shareholder a
fiduciary duty? To owe a fiduciary duty, the person must either own a majority of the
outstanding shares or meet either category of the Stringer test.
The first question is, do dual voting structure meet the definition of majority shareholder?
As a preliminary matter, an outright majority of outstanding shares is not a concern of dual
voting structures. While that is often the case at the beginning of a business's life, however, as
they mature and raise capital, the stake in the company is spread among a larger group of people.
Typically, a founder, in this case, will be left with a minority stake as the company grow into its
business model. The issue with dual-voting structures is the separation between ownership and
control. A shareholder can holder as little as 5% of the share outstanding but retain 90% of the
voting power; thus, as a whole dual voting structure fails to meet this definition.
The next question is, does a shareholder meet the definition of the stringer test?
Under Stringer, there are two ways to be a controlling shareholder: (1) have exercise actual
189
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control over the business and affairs of the company or dominate the company board of directors
or (2) a member of a small group of shareholders who collectively own a majority of shares or
otherwise have that domination or control. 193 At the heart of the issue is that their control interest
is derived “by virtue of the person’s position as a shareholder.” 194
The first issue under this test is, do these shareholders with superior voting rights belong
to certain groups that make up a majority? These groups are either: (1) an individual belongs to a
group of shareholders that make up a majority or (2) a person belongs to a group such as a
consortium or family that has control. 195
In the case of dual voting structures, these shareholders do not belong to a group of
shareholders that make up a majority. The reason that this structure exists is that they grant
control of a corporation without the need to have majority ownership. As already stated, the issue
with dual-voting structure is that they remove voting rights from ownership interest. These
shareholders, even as a group, do not need to make up a majority interest, nor do they belong to a
group, consortium, family, or other groups to have control of the company via the shareholder
interest. More importantly, in many cases, these shareholders only have a minority interest by a
percentage of the numbers of shares. The courts have not yet determined that mere membership
as a director or officer is a functional equivalent for this test. Lastly, their ability to call for a
meeting derived more often from their position as an officer/director. Thus, a dual voting
structure fails this part of the disjunctive test.
The last issue is, do they have actual control or domination of the board of directors?
Control is a function of power over the day-to-day and big picture objectives. As a conceded
193
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point, these shareholders have a significant level of control over the company. However, the
question turns on whether that control is a result of their status as a shareholder?
Under Del Corporation Code § 141(a), the business and affairs of the corporation is
vested in the officers and directors. In most cases, a shareholder with superior voting rights is
either an officer or a director, if not both, which means that their veto power and control of the
company is primarily derived from the statutory authority for this position in the company and
not as a shareholder.
The next question is, do these dominating shareholder effect of control over the board of
directors? The problem with dual voting structures is the entrenching effects of management and
directors. Typically, management and directors already have control over the board of directors
nominating committee by making up the committee despite the type of structure
employed. 196 Moreover, management generally has shareholder support, abject absence, and
blind support, even in the case of electing boards, even in a single class system. 197 So again, the
selection and makeup of the board of directors is a function of the position in the company and
not as a matter of their voting power. Also, in many cases, the board of directors is made up of
independent directors. That only leaves their ability to fire the board, but the mere ability to do
so is not enough alone. It would require threats or something more. 198 Thus, a dual voting
structure fails this part of the disjunctive test.
On balance, a shareholder with superior voting rights in a dual voting structure are
neither majority shareholders nor a controlling shareholder, which means that they do not owe
the minority shareholder a fiduciary duty.
196
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Breakdown of The Responsibility Under Fiduciary Duty
The remainder of this paper will act as if fiduciary do apply to these cases. In general,
majority owners and controlling shareholders have a fiduciary duty to the minority
shareholders. 199 The reasoning behind this shift is to show the difference the application of
fiduciary duty would have on these kinds of structures.
A fiduciary is “to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the
agency relationship.” 200 The fiduciary can be broken down into sub duties of loyalty, good faith,
and care. 201
The Applicable Standards for Judging Breach
The default rule for a business agent is the business judgment rule. 202 This rule is
favorable to officers and directors because the courts will defer to their judgment. 203 To meet the
business judgment rule, there are three elements: the agent must have acted “(1) in good faith, (2)
with the care that a reasonably prudent person would use, and (3) with the reasonable belief that
the director is acting in the best interests of the corporation.” 204 The burden is on the plaintiff
when an agent pleads this standard. 205
The standard that would apply under fiduciary duty for these bad faith and disloyal
actions is the entire fairness standard. 206 This standard is a heightened standard that is more
favorable to the principal because it is more fact-intensive and places less deference on the
199
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agent's actions. 207 The standard shifts the burden from the plaintiff and forces the defendant to
prove that the deal was fair on the stakeholders’ side. 208 This fact means that the agent must
show both the process in which the result was fairly done as well as the substantive results of the
process. 209
Duty of loyalty
An agent is "not to acquire a material benefit from a third party in connection with
transactions conducted or other actions taken on behalf of the principal or otherwise through the
agent's use of the agent's position." 210 The material benefit is defined as “explicit, direct, and
pecuniary in nature” or “indirectly if the benefit is acquired through the agent’s use of position or
in connection with a transaction conducted on behalf of the principal.” 211
The reasoning behind this rule is the expectation that an agent is a substitute for the
principal, and they must act in the principal’s best interest.

212

It would be unjust for the agent to

force the principal to be a party to a deal that benefits the agent at the expense of the principal,
barring consent by the principal. 213
Next, an agent must not “deal with the principal as or on behalf of an adverse party in a
transaction connected with the agency relationship.” 214 An agent has an adverse interest in the
deal when (1) the agent has a substantial economic interest or (2) the deal involves a close friend
or family member of the agent. 215 The reasoning of this rule is that an agent working in an

207
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adversarial way creates conflict between the agent and the principal, barring the consent of the
principal. 216
Additionally, “[a]n agent has a duty[:] (1) not to use property of the principal for the
agent’s own purposes or those of a third party; and (2) not to use or communicate confidential
information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party.” 217 Generally,
an agent who has actual possession is limited to using the property of the principal only for uses
that benefit the principal. 218 When an agent uses the property to cause the harm to the principal,
competes with them, or the agent’s use benefits only the agent, this would violate the agent’s
duty. 219
Lastly, “an agent has a duty to refrain from competing with the principal and from taking
action on behalf of or otherwise assisting the principal’s competitors.” 220 Actions by an agent
that directly compete or assist the principal's competition even when the agent refrains from
using confidential information violates the duty. 221
Duty of Care
An additional duty that an agent has is a duty of care. The duty of care requires that the
agent “act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar
circumstances.” 222 In essence, the duty requires that an agent must perform their duties in a
manner customary in line with someone in the same profession or role. This rule requires that the
agent take actions that are financially, ethically (within the mission of the business), and legally
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sound. 223 This duty requires that the agent seek out the advice of those with superior knowledge.
This duty also requires that an agent avail themselves of all material information before
deciding. 224 The agent must also have sufficient opportunity to acquire and access the
knowledge. 225 Lastly, the agent cannot only accept the information presented to them by other
people. 226
Duty of good faith
Lastly, the agent must act in good faith. 227 The essential part of the duty of good faith is
that the agent must act for the benefit of the corporation and fulfill their duties without violating
the law. 228 The duty of good faith requires that the agent act in a manner that is conscious of their
responsibilities as a fiduciary. 229
Will “We” Be Sued?
Mr. Neumann and We Co. have faced intense backlash for many of the actions and
decisions that the company has made since their founding in New York. However, the
shareholders have not rectified the decisions of the former CEO because of the uneven power
dynamics. That dynamic is true even with the company’s largest shareholder Softbank who
owned about 30% of the outstanding shares. 230 So far, these investors’ only option is a campaign
to put pressure on Mr. Neumann and the company to force change. The pressure and need for an
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influx of cash have caused Mr. Neumann to step down as CEO and reduce his voting power from
a high 20 votes to the current 3 votes per share. 231
Another avenue that should be available to investors is suing for breach of fiduciary duty.
At “the heart of the fiduciary duty is an attitude of seeking” the interest of the principal over that
of the agent, “which might suggest that failing to seek the interest of the minority is sufficient to
show a breach of duty.” 232 Since dual voting structure showed be considered the functional
equivalent to that of controlling shareholders, they should have the same obligations that are
controlling shareholders have. This section will analyze the acts of Mr. Neumann and We Co. to
see if violations have occurred. 233
The shifting of tax burden from Class to Class
Mr. Neumann had the business implement a tax scheme that shifted the burden of future
profits on to a specific stock class. 234 The basis of the tax scheme was to places the burden of
paying taxes on profits onto the inferior shareholders. The issue is, does creating a tax scheme
that explicitly benefits Mr. Neumann at the expense of the other shareholder breach his fiduciary
duty? At issue here is the duty of loyalty and does the act of creating a tax scheme that benefits
himself over that of the principal violates a fiduciary duty of loyalty?
The nature of creating a tax scheme that exclusively grants Mr. Neumann’s stock, a tax
benefit, specifically paying a lower tax bill, while simultaneously transferring the tax burden on
the others, violates the duty. The creation of this kind of scheme allows Mr. Neumann a material
benefit of increasing his monetary value in capital stock while also deriving the other shareholder
of value. The act is a result of Mr. Neumann’s authority as an agent, officer, and superior
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shareholder. This act is also self-dealing from his position as an agent because the scheme solely
creates benefits for him while stealing wealth and money away from the other shareholders. The
agent’s act diminishes the return that the principal would otherwise be entitled to if not for the
wrongful act of enriching himself. This act is a violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.

The profiteering off the “We®” Trademark
Mr. Neumann registered the trademark of “We” with a company that he controls but is not
affiliated with WeWork, which he then attempted to sell to WeWork. 235 The issue is whether
independently creating a trademark that We Co.’s desires while an officer for WeWork, then
selling the mark to We Co. would be a violation of his duty? At issue here is the duty of loyalty.
The duty of loyalty is violated when an agent creates a trademark derivative of the principal’s
work and then selling the mark back to the company.
The act of registering the mark was a violation because the act created a conflict of
interest. When the CEO of the company acquires a trademark in a capacity outside of his
corporate role for a mark that is derivative of the company name, he is stealing economic
opportunity from the principal. The company would have a valuable benefit from the use of the
trademark because of the nature of the mark’s connection to the brand of the organization,
especially the use of the mark "We," which is the name of the parent company.
Moreover, the act of trying to sell the asset to the company violates the duty because it
put Mr. Neuman in the position where he is a hostile party to the principal. Arguably, the
company has a right to the mark due to the agent creating it, but in order to get it back, the
company must use people under that agent control to do so. Mr. Neumann has the personal
interest to see that the principal pays as much as possible and the ability to ensure that outcome
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by virtue of his position as an agent. Since there is substantial economic interest for the agent and
it is averse to the principal, this is a violation of the duty of loyalty.
Mr. Neumann’s Soaring Issue
Mr. Neumann had We Co. purchase a $60 million jet that would primarily be for his
personal use. 236 The issue is, does an agent purchase an asset that is primarily the agent’s benefit
a violation of fiduciary duty? The act of having the principal purchase a jet for his personal use is
a violation of the duty of loyalty and care.
The duty of loyalty requires that the agent not use the property for the principal in a
manner that is exclusively beneficial to the agent. Additionally, the duty of care requires that an
agent act in a reasonable manner on behalf of the agent. In this case, the fact that Mr. Neumann
brought a jet that the company could not afford (the company has not yet made a profit),
primarily for personal use, shows an issue. 237 This act is a violation because the principal would
likely use the money in a manner more consistent with the purpose and mission of the business.
The jet takes money away from that mission and serves no purpose. While a principal may
consent to such an arrangement, however, public records show that the officers and directors
exclusively made the decision of the company. None of them are independent people from Mr.
Neumann that can look out for the principal’s interest. On balance, this is likely a violation of
Mr. Neumann’s fiduciary duty.
Drinking We’s Problems Away
Mr. Neumann has a habit of purchasing a copious amount of expensive alcoholic
beverages for the company’s functions. 238 At issue here is the duty of care. For this duty, the
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standard is the business judgment rule. The purchase of drinks on the company dime and the
specific situation is a violation of the duty of care.
The issue is, does Mr. Neumann's continued delivery of alcohol to his employee conflict
with the best interest of the principal? While free alcohol is a common perk among startup
communities, the fact that Mr. Neuman provides expensive bottles of alcohol while the company
is losing money is a concern. 239 This act violates the duty of care because if the interest of the
principal is to maximize returns, then this perk should be either eliminated in order to reduce cost
or reduced to lower brands of alcohol and less frequent. The fact that Mr. Neumann continues the
perk of purchasing expensive drinks after firing a significant portion of the workforce in order to
cut costs not only defeats the purpose of the move but may open the company up to liability.
While Mr. Neumann may argue that the company is keeping with the industry norms of
providing drinks, that argument is ultimately defeated by the callous decision to provide these
drinks after a layoff to save cost. This reduction would have been money that the company could
have to save or use in a manner that would increase revenue. Mr. Neumann would have difficulty
in arguing that the layoff was in the best interest of the company because keeping this initiative
while layoff personnel that brings in revenue or operates the business shows that Mr. Neumann
did not consider others more effective means to control costs. Overall, this act is a violation of
the duty.
We’s Insider Track to Contract Selection
Mr. Neumann personally has an ownership interest in serval of the buildings that
WeWork currently leases office space from. 240 More so, the company also has a host of
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transactions that involve friends and family of Mr. Neumann and other insiders. 241 These
transactions raise the question of whether there is a conflict of interest that breached a fiduciary
duty. At issue here is the duty of loyalty.
Again Mr. Neuman is in a duty of loyalty conflict by the fact that he is on two sides of a
transaction. Mr. Neumann has a substantial economic benefit as the owner of the building of
WeWork paying top rental dollars while simultaneously having an interest in the company
paying as little as possible.
Additionally, We Co. is stacked with vendors, executives, and employees that got their
job or contracts through a personal connection to Mr. Neumann or other insiders in the company.
Typically, the presence of these kinds of action is not an issue for corporations; however, it can
be when these transactions are the corporate norm for the business instead of a rare event.
If the goal of the principal is the creation of a profitable company, then that would
require hiring the best people and getting good contractors for low prices. The mere presence of
signs of nepotism is not proof that a violation has occurred. However, it supports the belief that a
violation may occur. When the contractor or deal involves a friend of the boss, it is harder to
reject the contract, and it is inherently more natural to be chosen than a potentially better
contractor. Based on the public information available, there is a case to be made that We Co.
have violated its duty of loyalty.
Lawsuit Pending?
In reality, We Co. have faced little consequence for the numerous corporate governance
missteps. The consequence for the company has been limited to public backlash, Mr. Neumann
stepping down from being CEO (but remains chair of the board and superior shareholder), and
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the company pulling their registration statement for their IPO. These acts are all a result of the
fact that Mr. Neumann does not have a fiduciary duty to inferior shareholders.
However, when that standard is applied, We Co. missteps are harder to ignore. Under a
fiduciary duty standard, the minority shareholders would be able to sue the company for the
actions of Mr. Neumann. This ability would allow We Co. to fire Mr. Neumann as both an
officer and director. Additionally, the inferior shareholders would be able to put more caps on his
power as a superior shareholder and make the company implements policies that would prevent
future violations of a similar nature.
As the law stands now, there is little to no recourse for shareholders against actions like
Mr. Neumann’s. The fact remains that Mr. Neumann does not have a fiduciary duty to these
shareholders. For the shareholders, this means the company is not obligated to prevent these
actions from recurring. While Mr. Neumann is no longer CEO, and some deals have been
undone that does not assure shareholders in any meaningful way. Mr. Neumann could be
reinstated as CEO like Steve Jobs has been in the past, and a similar violation can occur in the
future. This fact would all lead a reasonable shareholder of We Co. to have doubts about the
company's future.
Next Steps
"There no better way to overpower a trickle of doubt than with a flood of naked truth." 242
The truth of the matter is that is, while WeWork was the focus of the analysis of this paper, the
company is not alone in its corporate governance concerns. As stated above, many people see
this as a feature of a dual voting structure system and not a simple bug or one-time occurrence.
Similar findings can be made for Uber, Lyft, Snap, and many others.
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However, this paper is not meant to be an indictment against the structure or a call for
action for the abolition of the structure. There are companies like Berkshire Hathaway that have
to utilize this same structure without similar violations. The issues raised in this paper calls in
question what, if anything, should be done to address the concern. As a country, the U.S. has
several options available in order to address the concerns raised by this kind of structure, which
will be outlined in the following pages.
The Roundtable response
In Business RoundTable V. SEC, the organization fought the SEC against the
implementation of a ban on dual voting structures. 243 The organization argued that the
regulation of these entities was outside the scope of the SEC. 244 The organization’s approaches
to dual voting structures were that investors should operate under the notion of caveat emptor,
meaning that it is on the investor to be aware of bad business operations and governance schemes
of the businesses that they invest in.
The case set the status quo for a regulatory scheme for the last 29 years of a hands-off
approach to these businesses. While these structures allowed for great success, such as Warren
Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway, they also have allowed for the excess described in WeWork.
However, this case takes away a large part of investors’ rights away to correct misdeeds. The
investor is unable to fire the transgressor and may not have any legal rights to sue for the
transgression. This fact leaves investors’ only option to sell their shares, and that may not always
be possible for a company like WeWork, who is still a privately held company. Not only is this
type of approach a lousy investment for the average investor, but it is also harmful to society at
large because there are fewer methods to correct adverse business action even if influential
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investors like large institutional investors support the changes. Therefore, this approach is not the
best one to continue.
The Council of Institutional Investor approach
The Council of Institutional Investor (CII) approach is the reduction of these types of
businesses. 245 The goal of the CII is that all corporations should have one vote per share. The CII
has advocated for these companies to be required to have a sunset provision that would bring
them in line with one share one vote after a specific time period. 246 The CII and other group’s
advocacy have caused a couple of stock exchanges to consider the elimination of these types of
business from their listings. While this may remove the excesses of companies like WeWork, it
would also remove the successes of companies like Berkshire Hathaway.
This approach eliminates the notion that people are capable of picking investments that
they believe are right for them. The whole approach behind the SEC was that sunshine
(disclosure of material information) is the best approach and not regulatory red tape that dictates
what investment is right for the American public. More so, some investors are ok with a dual
voting structure solely because they support the founder and are willing to accept the risk
associated with the structure. The risk of this approach is not wholly advantageous because this
could cause companies to be underfunded for founders fearing to lose complete control of the
business. 247 Alternatively, these businesses could choose not to go public in order to skirt these
laws. The last option they have is the Manchester United approach. 248 Manchester United is a
UK soccer team that decided to list on the NYSE in order to have a dual voting structure.249
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Manchester United approach is where a company lists in a country that allows it to have dual
voting structures. 250
This option would be a drag on the U.S. economy because companies are not reaching
their full potential. Also, it would go against the notion that people have the right to make the
deal even if the deal may be a bad one. This approach of determining that these structures are
always bad goes against a person’s right to make that decision for themselves. Therefore, this
approach is not the best one to continue.
Recommendation
Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis is noted for saying that “Sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” 251 In the case at
hand, the fiduciary duty is "the best of disinfectants," and the entire fairness doctrine is “the most
efficient policeman.”.
This approach allows for companies like Berkshire Hathaway to exist while limiting the
excessive of companies like WeWork. This result is possible because it is not the complete
abolition approach as advocated by the CII, nor is it the status quo of a hands-off approach. This
middle ground bounds the excess by bringing dual-voting structures in line with the traditional
business structure by using litigation and shareholder rights to force change. This approach also
does not cap the ability of a company like Berkshire Hathaway to operate like other businesses
where that approach may not work.
Additionally, these shareholders with superior rights are already beholden to the
shareholder and the company at large because of their roles as officers and directors. To add on,
the obligations of fiduciary duty to minority shareholders would be limited in cost and time to
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implement. This approach can be effective. The Delaware Chancery has already adopted this
approach for the majority shareholder by the number of shares and controlling
shareholders. Additionally, many other states apply the rule in similar situations.
If the problem with the Business RoundTable approach reduces the rights of investors,
then this approach restores investors’ options. A shareholder has legal remedies to go after the
transgressor. This approach is specifically helpful when the companies are still private, and they
do not have the option of selling their shares. Last it would be in line with stare decisis. In the
past, controlling and majority shareholders had been subjected to fiduciary duty obligations to
minority shareholders in order to limit their power. 252
Conclusion
A dual-voting structure is a corporate strategy that allows founders and management to
retain control of the business. Alone this has many practical business advantages like the ability
to make a long-term decision. This feat is done by splitting the voting power from the economic
interest in a share. However, this structure has not been without its issues. This split has allowed
companies like WeWork to get away with things that would ordinarily be a violation of their
fiduciary duty to inferior shareholders. The unique nature of being both shareholders with
majority voting interest and officer/directors grants them relief from the fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholders because they are not clearly majority shareholder by economic interest or
controlling shareholder. Also, the outsize voting interest prevents the company from revolting
against them. The best approach to remedy this situation would be by applying fiduciary duty
obligations, specifically to controlling shareholders in dual voting structures.
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